European Security after Brexit: A British, French and German Perspective

Careful considerations, regarding the institutional framework and governance, but also possible fields of cooperation, need to be taken to make this triangle a functional and effective setting. Differences in threat perception and strategic culture and interests can be seen as a blessing in disguise. In the last few decades, we have become accustomed to the fact that foreign and security policy are very much in flux and that there is no discernible status quo any more. The series of supposed watershed moments, from 9/11 through to the Arab Spring, the Crimea Annexation all the way to the more recent tendency of the US to turn their back on international agreements and institutions, is commonly acknowledged.

In spite of all this, there may still be a certain logic in talking about a status quo, at least in the security and defence policy triangle between France, Germany and the UK. A similar set of threats and challenges, a deep and highly institutionalised set of relations based not only in the common membership in the European Union, but also NATO, OSCE and UN as well as common initiatives like the E3 in Iran form a stable web of trust and cooperative reflexes between these states. At least, this was the case before Brexit happened and old certainties seemed to vanish and trust has been lost. The question that is now looming is, how do we proceed from here?

Read the full report here.