The consequences of Brexit for European security and defence

Research Paper prepared for FES Berlin workshop on 1ˢᵗ December 2016

Draft Version

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Executive Summary

This paper will examine what the current UK contribution is to EU security in information and intelligence sharing, as well as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). While the former will hone in on non-traditional security threats and the EU's current intelligence information sharing platforms, the latter will look at the EU's defence agencies and CSDP missions and operations. The objective is to understand what the UK currently contributes in these areas to understand what might potentially be lost post-Brexit, as well as what the UK will lose if negotiations result in the UK withdrawing from participation in EU security structures. It will also determine areas of mutual interest where continued cooperation between the UK and the EU post-Brexit may be desirable. Although it is too early to tell how Brexit negotiations will be structured and evolve, this paper seeks to inform the Brexit debate regarding the nature of UK security relations within the EU framework.

Below sets out some of the key points of the paper:

<u>**Justice and Home Affairs**</u>

Information Sharing and Law Enforcement Cooperation Mechanisms

- The UK participates in a number of EU information sharing and law enforcement cooperation mechanisms. The key mechanisms include Europol; Europol's European Arrest Warrant (EAW) system; Second Generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), which is an IT system that helps law enforcement share real-time alerts on people of interest; the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS), which allows the secure exchange of information on criminal convictions between EU Member State authorities; the Passenger Name Record Initiative (PNR), which is an EU-wide collection of passenger name data for air travel; and the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN), which sits within the European External Action Service (EEAS) that provides information to the High Representative/Vice President based on contributions from Member States' intelligence and security services. The UK was due to connect to Prüm, a cross-European agreement to search DNA and fingerprint databases, in 2017.
- There are clearly benefits to participating in these systems. For example, the Prüm system

helped to identify Salah Abdeslam as a suspect in the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015. However, there have also been flaws in the system of information sharing. For example, Belgian authorities were warned by Turkey twice that Ibrahim El Bakraoui was a suspected ISIS fighter but failed to register concerns on any EU terror watch list. El Bakraoui went on to participate in the Brussels terrorist attacks in 2016.

- Europol allows liaison officers from non-EU countries to cooperate, and there are bilateral relations between the EU and third countries for PNR. However, there is little precedent for non-EU and non-Schengen countries to participate in the information sharing mechanisms. Therefore, if the UK and EU decide that it is in the interests of both parties to continue cooperation when the UK is outside of the EU, brand new legal and practical frameworks may need to be created.

- The strength of the UK intelligence services is an asset to the EU. The UK has also drawn significant benefits from being connected to European platforms. According to Europol chief Rob Wainwright, around 40% of Europol's cases have a 'British dimension', highlighting the degree to which the UK not only provides information but also is able to benefit in terms of national security. There is clearly mutual benefit from continued cooperation. Even if there is no precedent for such cooperation, this should not be a barrier to thinking creatively about the structure of future frameworks to ensure both sides benefit from continued cooperation.

- Some have argued that intelligence and information sharing can be done effectively outside EU structures, examples being the Kilowatt network, Megatonne intelligence network and the Berne Club. Others have emphasized that the UK will still be part of the Five Eyes intelligence sharing group. Despite this, there is clearly a value for the UK to be part of a European initiative on this, which is promoted by the EU.

- Brexit could have an impact on the operations of the UK intelligence services. If Brexit means these services are no longer hindered by European rules, regulations and institutions, they could operate more flexibly. The recent European Court of Justice (ECJ) preliminary ruling over the legality of the GCHQ's bulk interception of phone call records and online messages is a case in point.

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

- The UK has been a key contributor, although not the strongest, on EU missions. Although it is difficult to find exact figures, a House of Commons research briefing in August 2016 the UK share in military operations made up 14.82% of common costs. Information provided by the FCO to a European Union Committee report in February 2016 indicates that the UK contributes approximately 16% of CFSP budget that funds civilian missions. The UK ranks fifth among the contributors to CSDP military operations and seventh in terms of civilian missions.

- More significantly, the UK has contributed key assets to assist with operations. For example, the UK is one of the few nations that can contribute an operational headquarters, which it does for operation Atalanta off the Horn of Africa. The UK provided a frigate for this mission five months in both 2009 and 2011 and two Royal fleet Auxiliary vessels for a month each in 2013. HMS Bulwark rescued 4,747 migrants in May-July 2015 as part of EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia.

- Historically, the UK has been a strong advocate of elements of the CSDP, as shown by the British-French Saint-Malo Declaration in 1998. However, in more recent years, the UK has been seen more as a state blocking further EU defence integration. The UK's main opposition has been over concerns that creating a permanent operational headquarters to provide command and control for EU missions and operations will duplicate NATO capabilities. It also potentially undermines the transition between NATO military

operations to EU missions, as shown by Operation Althea, an EU capacity building initiative amongst authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

- To many in the EU, therefore, the UK's departure from the Union opens up new opportunities for pushing through plans that will allow for further integration and commitment to EU-wide approaches on defence and security. This has been highlighted by the fact that, since Brexit, more serious discussions of further integrated European defence research, armed forces and command headquarter have emerged.

- This is not to say that there are guarantees of a fully integrated EU defence programme, as there are still significant differences in operation approach, capabilities and buy-in from remaining EU member states. However, if the EU does streamline its defence and security integration, over time the UK could lose relevance as these developments take place whilst it is outside the decision-making structures.

- The main thing that the UK will lose regarding CSDP is its seat at the decision-making table, which is useful both for determining the trajectory of EU foreign policy but also a way for the UK to further its own national interests. There are complex processes for deciding on CFSP and CSDP policies, which involve various levels of engagement. The UK would lose its voice in these organisations.

- Compared to the intelligence and information sharing mechanisms, there is greater precedent for non-EU countries to cooperate on CSDP missions and operations. This also applies to other CSDP-relevant organisations, such as the European Defence Agency (EDA). The UK could still work with the EDA through agreements like that which Norway has.

- The UK will continue to have strong bilateral defence relations with other EU countries, such as France and increasingly Germany. For example, the UK has provided bilateral airlift support to France after the latter's unilateral intervention into Mali in January 2013 as well as support to the EU Training Mission. NATO will continue to be a major platform through which the UK conducts multilateral defence policy. Although the election of Donald Trump as US president may add an unexpected variable into the UK's defence thinking, the SDSR does emphasize US-UK military collaboration.

- The UK has indicated that it would like to continue cooperating with the EU on CSDP, given the shared interest in defence and security. However, post-Brexit the UK is likely to focus its cooperation further on activities linked to national interests, particularly the UK's own national security threats. Part of the negotiations will depend on the mood in Brussels and whether the UK will present its case as 'leverage'. Misreading the strength of the UK's negotiating power could have detrimental effects on the EU's willingness to continue cooperation.

Justice and Home Affairs

Justice and Home Affairs became one of the three pillars in formal EU policy under the Maastricht Treaty in 1992-3. The pillar of Justice and Home Affairs provided the basis on which EU members could cooperate on addressing immigration and asylum, civil law, policing and criminal law, including counter-terrorism, serious crime and fraud. There are a number of EU platforms and mechanisms in place to foster closer cooperation on issues such as counter-terrorism and law enforcement, allowing the sharing of information and intelligence, which the UK has been actively involved in.

However, in principle the UK has sought limitations on the say the EU can have over Justice and Home Affairs, demonstrating its desire to retain more sovereignty than many other member states over Justice and Home Affairs, given that in the 1990s it requested the right decide whether to opt-in or out of EU proposals on Justice and Home Affairs.[1] If the UK chooses to opt-out of EU initiatives, it will still have a seat at the negotiating table but does not have a vote on the shape of the proposal.

Despite this approach, the UK has played a key role in participating in new practices and establishing new links. The UK is seen as valuable in this given its integrated intelligence capabilities and law enforcement agencies. Although the UK's existing security capabilities are significant, its cooperation with the EU on this has also been valuable for enhancing the UK's national security. According to the Director of Europol, UK national Rob Wainwright, 'over the last ten years, unique EU cooperation instruments such as Europol and information sharing through institutionalized systems connecting 28 countries have become a mainstream part of how Britain protects its borders, economic well-being and people'.[2] Following the UK's decision to leave the EU, the future of the UK in EU security mechanisms and information sharing platforms may have to be renegotiated. To do so, the UK and the EU will have to assess the strengths of UK contributions to the EU security structures, as well as the benefits the UK draws from contributing.

Given the sensitivities around the information, it is obviously difficult to definitively quantify how exactly the UK's contribution to EU information or intelligence sharing mechanisms has resulted in the prevention of terrorist activity or the disruption of criminal networks. However, it is still useful to examine the platforms and mechanisms that exist to facilitate information sharing between EU member states, which the UK participates in, to assess where there may be a shared value for either continued UK cooperation or where this in itself may be less of a priority post-Brexit.

Intelligence and information sharing platforms

The UK participates in the **European Arrest Warrant (EAW)[3]** – an extradition arrangement between European Member States. According to National Crime Agency (NCA) data:

> *'Prior to 2004 fewer than 60 individuals a year were extradited from the UK (this figure includes all countries, not just EU Member States). Since 2004 the EAW has enabled the UK to extradite over 7,000 individuals accused or convicted of a criminal offence to other Member States. Over 95% of these were extraditions of*

[1] https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/466238/jha-opt-in-background.pdf

[2] https://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/The-EU-and-Terrorism_Maajid-Nawaz-and-Julia-Ebner.pdf

[3] http://db.eurocrim.org/db/en/doc/1197.pdf

foreign nationals. Over the same period the EAW has been used to extradite over 1,000 individuals to the UK to face justice in the UK'.[4]

The key advantage of membership of the EAW is speed, with extraditions taking on average three months instead of 10 for non-EU jurisdictions.[5]

The UK is a member of **Europol**, which is responsible for operating the system of EAW. The current director, Rob Wainwright, is a former UK intelligence officer. The UK has been an increasingly active user of this platform. According to Europol data, 'the UK exchanged 26% more messages on SIENA [Secure Information Exchange Network Application, which facilitates communications within Europol] in 2015 than in 2014; and initiated 22% more cases on it over the same period'.[6] The United Kingdom is one of the top 10 countries in terms of contributions to Europol staff.[7] Europol has also provided specific support to member states at a time of crisis. For example, after the Paris attacks Europol assigned approximately 60 officers to support French and Belgian investigations.[8]

Following the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels in 2015 and 2016, there have been efforts towards better coordination between law enforcement and intelligence agencies, inside the EU and externally, by facilitating the exchange of information. Against this backdrop, Europol established the **European Counter-Terrorism Centre (ECTC)** in January 2016 to act as a central hub by which law enforcement agencies can increase information sharing on foreign fighters, terrorist financing, online terrorist propaganda and extremism (Internal Referral Unit) and illegal arms trafficking.

Another development in the wake of the Paris and Brussels attacks was the creation of the **Passenger Name Record initiative** (PNR). In April 2016, the EU allowed for airlines to transfer passenger name record data, which is personal information collected and held by air carriers, to member states' law enforcement authorities.[9] This is something the UK had advocated for some time.[10] The initiative assists law enforcement agencies' tracking of terrorist and other suspects into and within the EU. Although many member states were already able to use PNR data under national law, this decision to set up an EU PNR system was aimed at harmonizing member states' legal provisions on this issue. Countries outside the EU will normally require either a direct agreement with the EU or bilateral agreements with individual Member States in order to acquire PNR. Professor Steve Peers at the University of Essex notes that the EU has already signed such agreements with the United States, Canada and Australia.[11]

There is also a cross-European agreement to search DNA and fingerprint databases called **Prüm**. This allows Member States to check if suspects are featured in other Member State DNA databases. The UK is due to be connected to Prüm in 2017, even though there was

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[4] HM Government, 'The UK's cooperation with the EU on Justice and Home Affairs, and on foreign policy and security issues', http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/may/eu-uk-jha-fa-coop.pdf

[5] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-14/safer-borders-why-brexit-may-be-good-news-to-european-criminals

[6] http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/may/eu-uk-jha-fa-coop.pdf

[7] Others are the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Romania, Poland and Greece. Europol consolidated annual activity report 2015, https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/consolidated-annual-activity-report-2015

[8] https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol%E2%80%99s-european-counter-terrorism-centre-strengthens-eu%E2%80%99s-response-to-terror

[9] http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/passenger-name-record/

[10] http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/may/eu-uk-jha-fa-coop.pdf

[11] http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2016/06/eu-referendum-brief-5-how-would-brexit.html

uncertainty surrounding this decision after the UK referendum on the EU.[12] A pilot period of usage in 2015 proved highly effective in bringing a number of non-terrorist offenders to police attention. Thus far, the benefits of the system are clear: the bio data exchange through Prüm between French and Belgian authorities following the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015 greatly aided their ability to identify Salah Abdeslam.[13] At present, only Norway and Iceland have concluded third-party agreements with the EU over access to Prüm. They are, however, both part of the Schengen area.

As of April 2015, the UK forms part of the **Second Generation Schengen Information System (SIS II)** acts as a watch list through which law enforcement of member states have access to operational data on terrorist suspects and criminals. It assists law enforcement by sharing real-time alerts principally on people of interest that are, for example, wanted for arrest for extradition, missing persons, witnesses, absconders or subjects of criminal judgments. While this includes monitoring the movement of individuals participating in organized crime, SIS II has also helped EU Member States track foreign fighters returning from Syria and Iraq, enabling them to be tracked through Europe.[14] In April 2016, the UK received 25 hits on 'foreign alerts in relation to individuals who could pose a risk to national security'.[15] Although SIS II helps facilitate European cooperation for law enforcement, immigration and border control, the UK only participates in the law enforcement aspects given that it is not part of the Schengen area. Following Brexit, it remains unclear whether it the UK will be able to negotiate access to the SIS II, as all countries with access are either full EU Member States or members of the Schengen border-free area.

The **European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS)**, established in April 2012, provides for the secure exchange of information on criminal convictions between EU Member State authorities. Following the Paris attacks, the European Commission has proposed extending ECRIS to include criminal records of third country nationals (TCNs) convicted in the EU and to oblige EU Member States to collect and exchange fingerprint data of TCNs. While the UK is part of this data sharing system, no non-EU country currently has access to ECRIS. This includes Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein which instead use the 1959 Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters or informal Interpol channels. In addition to being a more costly and time-consuming alternative, there is also no obligation to exchange information within a specific timeframe in the alternative and informal arrangements.[16]

The **UK was also a founder of the EU's Intelligence Analyses Center (INTCEN)** – a body that has existed in its current form since 2012. INTCEN was previously called Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN), which was set up as a forum to exchange sensitive information between the intelligence services of Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK.[17] INTCEN's current mission is to provide intelligence analyses, early warning and situational awareness to the EEAS and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, as well as the EU Member States' representatives in the Political and Security Committee (PSC). Analysis is mainly based on information from Member States' intelligence and security services, open sources, diplomatic reporting, consular warden networks, international organisations, NGOs, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

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[12] http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-has-decided-to-opt-into-eu-crime-fighting-measures-risking-anger-of-brexit-tory-mps-a7391666.html
[13] http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/may/eu-uk-jha-fa-coop.pdf
[14] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-joins-international-security-alert-system
[15] http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/may/eu-uk-jha-fa-coop.pdf
[16] http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/may/eu-uk-jha-fa-coop.pdf
[17] http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-223-eu-intcen.pdf

missions and operations.[18] It feeds into decision-making bodies in the fields of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), CSDP and EU thinking on counter-terrorism. INTCEN is not an operational agency.[19] While there has been discussion of formalizing this into a more operational intelligence capability, it has not progressed further.[20]

The UK's Debate on the Utility of EU Intelligence Platforms

A majority of RUSI's contacts among UK security officials have highlighted the importance of European connections in mitigating the current terrorism threat.[21] The EU, too, recognizes the UK's contribution to EU security. It was not by coincidence that the UK's EU Commissioner Julian King was given the important portfolio of 'Security Commissioner'. In doing so, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker signaled the important place that the UK holds in contributing to the bloc's security. Indeed, this was not lost on Commissioner King; at his European Parliament hearing, he stated that the 'UK will have to continue to work on counterterrorism with the EU and boost police and intelligence cooperation'.[22]

As already mentioned, there is little precedent for non-EU or non-Schengen area members to participate in some of these mechanisms. One UK government report highlighted the relevance of this for the EAW, Prüm, SIS II and ECRIS.[23] If the UK as a non-EU member is not able to participate, the UK will have to negotiate a bilateral agreement with either the EU as a whole or individual member states on this. As one analyst at IISS noted, 'Brexit would result in the UK being denied access to these datasets, at least until a series of bilateral data-sharing agreements with European states could be concluded'.[24]

Europol is one of the most prominent structures for UK security, and the UK is an active player. According to Europol chief Rob Wainwright, around 40% of Europol's cases have a 'British dimension', highlighting the degree to which the UK not only provides information but also is able to benefit in terms of national security.[25] It would be much easier to envisage continued UK participation with Europol, given that seven other non-EU countries,[26] not all of which are Schengen, contribute liaison officers. The ECTC also seeks for its resources to be compatible for use by third parties.[27] Moreover, Europol's liaison officers are able to use the SIENA platform. This could be an avenue for the UK if the status quo cannot be maintained.

Some would place less emphasis on the importance of the UK's participation in Europol for protecting the UK's own national security. Richard Walton, former head of the Counter Terrorism Command at New Scotland Yard, has argued that Europol 'while a useful discussion forum, is largely irrelevant to day-to-day operations within the counter-terrorism sphere'.[28] It is indeed important for sharing information, and the EAW is useful for tackling serious and

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[18] http://eu-un.europa.eu/factsheet-on-eu-intelligence-analyses-center-intcen/

[19] http://eu-un.europa.eu/factsheet-on-eu-intelligence-analyses-center-intcen/

[20] https://euobserver.com/justice/127532

[21] Raffaello Pantucci, Director, International Security Studies, RUSI

[22] http://www.wsj.com/articles/julian-king-set-to-become-u-k-s-last-eu-commissioner-1473765513?mg=id-wsj

[23] https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/504216/The_process_for_withdrawing_from_the_EU_print_ready.pdf

[24] Nigel Inkster, IISS, http://www.iiss.org/-/media//silos/survival/2016/survival-58-3/58-3-04-inkster-cm/58-3-04-inkster-cm.pdf

[25] https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/nov/04/germany-fears-uk-may-quit-spy-programme-because-of-brexit

[26] Including Albania, Australia, Canada, Colombia, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland

[27] http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/may/eu-uk-jha-fa-coop.pdf

[28] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/eureferendum/12175207/Being-in-the-EU-doesnt-keep-us-safe-from-terrorists.html

organized crime, but Walton argues that the benefits should not be over-stated, particularly as it does not run operations. However, there is still clearly value in have access to existing datasets that can facilitate law enforcement. Alison Saunders has said that 'the databases are there. It is about having access to them. My law enforcement colleagues who appeared before you made the point that opting into Europol is really very important because it gives us access to all the databases without having to do any bilateral agreements'.[29]

The UK's prospects for collaboration with Europol post-Brexit may have become more complex in light of a new regulation, however, which was agreed by the EU Assembly in May 2016. This is due to take effect in May 2017. Part of this regulation expands the role of the European Parliament and national EU legislatures in supervising Europol's operations.[30] In November 2016 the UK Home Office announced its intention to 'opt in' to the regulation. This will be scrutinized by the House of Commons and House of Lords EU scrutiny committee.[31] However, the legal practicalities of this post-Brexit could be challenging. As the *Financial Times* reports, while the UK will no longer recognize the European Parliament as having any authority over British laws and government policies, 'in order to stay in Europol ... Britain may have to accept the May 2016 regulation that grants the EU legislature some influence over Europol'.[32]

The EAW is a mechanism that is also highly valuable for the UK, as is the UK's contribution. Although the mechanism by which the UK could cooperate on EAW is not clear, there has been past endorsement of continuing to cooperate. During her time as Home Secretary, Prime Minister Theresa May had already strongly argued in favor of the EAW, noting that she considered it a 'vital tool for ensuring justice' was done in the UK and for keeping British citizens safe.[33] As mentioned, however, some would be skeptical that this is a definitive tool, crucial to the UK's protection of national security interests.

There has been some debate around how crucial the UK's participation is in these information and intelligence structures. Some have been positive. When asked how crucial EU databases such as Prüm were to the UK, Alison Saunders responded that they were of particular use in investigations and policing and argued strongly that the UK should continue to have access to them stating 'we would want to maintain the capability, both for law enforcement and for prosecutors'.[34] She went further, stating that although this would be for the Home Office to negotiate, if an agreement with the EU could be done 'on an EU-wide basis, that would be the easiest and most sensible way. You would get buy-in from all 27 countries. If you cannot do that, it would have to be done on a bilateral basis. The databases are there'.

Echoing Walton's points, some experts generally believe that the sharing of sensitive intelligence, rather than law enforcement data, may in fact be *more* desirable outside the EU framework. In his assessment of whether INTCEN should become a more formal EU Agency, John M. Nomikos noted that intelligence sharing had already commenced in Europe in the 1970s through independent networks, such as the Kilowatt network, Megatonne intelligence network and the Berne Club. The Kilowatt network was the code-name for multilateral intelligence cooperation efforts among intelligence services from the UK, France, West

[29] http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-home-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-future-ukeu-security-and-policing-cooperation/oral/42904.pdf
[30] https://www.ft.com/content/af9f5cda-4ff6-11e6-8172-e39ecd3b86fc
[31] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/parliament-notified-of-europol-opt-in-intention
[32] https://www.ft.com/content/af9f5cda-4ff6-11e6-8172-e39ecd3b86fc
[33] https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-secretary-speech-on-2014-decision
[34] http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-home-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-future-ukeu-security-and-policing-cooperation/oral/42904.pdf

Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, Ireland, Norway and Israel.[35] Megatonne, led by France, was a response to Algerian terrorism on the European mainland in the 1990s. The Berne Club, in turn, is a cooperation framework among Western European internal security services and is based on periodic meetings attended by the heads of the European Intelligence Services and has recently created an off-shoot called the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG).[36] Björn Fägersten, too, notes that 'the EU benefits from intelligence cooperation in support of internal security even if such cooperation is not attached to the Union nor focuses on supporting EU policy *per se*'.[37]

Calls for further EU integration on this issue, such as creating an equivalent of the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or National Security Agency (NSA), have been met with equal skepticism. Fägersten states that most calls for this tend 'to come from actors with rather weak intelligence capabilities of their own who seek common solutions. As long as it is only small states with limited capacity (or the European Commission that has even less), which are calling for more centralized cooperation, the prospects for success are slim'.[38] Furthermore, the idea that police officers, intelligence analysts and security services 'would be more inclined to share intelligence with newly established centralized organisations than with those partner countries they have often cooperated with for decades is… an uncertain bet'.[39] Indeed, future cooperation of EU intelligence agencies spans four categories. These include: *diverging preferences* of EU Member States to establish joint intelligence functions; *power asymmetries* and the creation of internal informal hierarchies between member states; bureaucratic interests within EU Member States that could impede cooperation; as well as missing infrastructures such as trust between actors, a shared professional culture and technical infrastructure.[40]

Some argue in favor of the UK relying predominantly on its intelligence sharing network 'Five Eyes', which includes Britain, the US, Australia, New Zealand and Canada.[41] But neither Five Eyes nor other networks, like the Berne Club would have prevented the Paris and Brussels attacks. Instead, it was the failure of properly integrated intelligence networks that proved fatal. Belgium was warned by Turkey twice that Ibrahim El Bakraoui was a suspected ISIS fighter but failed to register concerns on any EU terror watch list.[42] El Bakraoui was deported to Holland, but Belgium failed to inform the Dutch authorities. El Bakraoui went on to participate in the Brussels terrorist attacks in 2016.This, one would imagine, raises flags – in a new Europe facing non-traditional security threats like terrorism, the failure to share intelligence could literally be a matter of life or death.

It is debatable to what extent the EU would reject any alternative solution for the UK to establish mechanisms or create agreements which would allow the UK to continue to make use of and engage in them. The benefits of EU and UK cooperation and information sharing are clear – an EU that did not include the UK as a core component of its counter-terrorism and

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[35] http://www.rieas.gr/images/editorial/NomikosEUintelligence15.pdf
[36] Ibid.
[37] http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_8_EU_Intelligence_Cooperation.pdf
[38]http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_8_EU_Intelligence_Cooperation.pdf
39 Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] http://www.cityam.com/238971/five-eyes-this-intelligence-sharing-pillar-of-uk-security-is-in-peril-if-we-stay-inside-the-eu
[42] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/12203922/Britain-not-told-about-terror-fears-surrounding-Brussels-bomber.html

security efforts would be much weaker and it would be this, in turn, which would leave the UK facing greater security risks.[43]

There could be a benefit to the freedom of operation to the UK's intelligence agencies, as they could operate more independently without being bound by European rules, regulations and institutions. Sofia Patel of the Australia Strategic Policy Institute notes 'EU agencies and mechanisms such as Europol, Prüm, EWA, and the Schengen Information System have been criticized for clunky and bureaucratic processes'.[44] The recent European Court of Justice (ECJ) preliminary ruling over the legality of the GCHQ's bulk interception of phone call records and online messages is a case in point. In its preliminary ruling made in July 2016, the ECJ ruled that retaining data is legal only if law enforcement agencies use it to tackle serious crime.[45] The court's final decision has not yet been released. If GCHQ's actions are deemed to be illegal, this could directly impact the UK's domestic legislation, and in particular its Investigatory Powers Bill. This would become irrelevant once the UK leaves the EU and ECJ jurisdiction no longer holds authority over the UK.[46]

The question is then to what extent the UK will use its participation as a bargaining chip in the Brexit negotiations and how EU negotiators will weigh their options when considering a 'hard Brexit', 'soft Brexit' or highly pragmatic approach. But UK-EU security relies on more than just intra-EU Member State intelligence sharing. The UK has consistently blocked pro-federalist forces within the EU towards defence pooling and formalized joint defence structures. The next section will seek to identify what the UK and EU security stand to gain, or lose, post-Brexit.

Background to the Common Security and Defence Policy and the UK's role

The UK was an early advocate of a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), as shown by the British-French Saint-Malo declaration in 1998 signed by then Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Jacques Chirac. The declaration was seen as a response to the conflict in the Balkans, and it mentioned the need for a common defence policy, stating that 'Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology'. This was not intended to duplicate contributions to NATO, but instead 'in strengthening the solidarity between the Member States of the European Union, in order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs, whilst acting in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members'. This would pave the way to the European Security and Defence Policy, subsequently renamed in 2009 in the Lisbon Treaty as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and part of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The Lisbon Treaty states that the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) should provide the EU with 'operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets' that can be used on 'missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter'.[47] This

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43 http://www.iiss.org/-/media//silos/survival/2016/survival-58-3/58-3-04-inkster-cm/58-3-04-inkster-cm.pdf

44 https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/brexit-security-sleeper-issue/

45 Ibid.

46 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/19/bulk-data-collection-can-only-be-used-to-fight-serious

47 http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-european-union-and-comments/title-5-general-provisions-on-the-unions-external-action-and-specific-provisions/chapter-2-specific-provisions-

includes joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, crisis management and post-conflict stabilisation.[48]

Currently, the EU conducts a mixture of military operations and civilian missions. Military operations include: capacity building amongst authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina through Operation Althea; disrupting human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Mediterranean in a bid to tackle the migration crisis as part of EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia; military training missions for the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic, Mali and Somalia; and the EUNAVFOR Somalia counter-piracy operation off the Horn of Africa. There are numerous civilian missions, ranging from civilian security sector reform in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine), the reform programme for the civilian police service in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) and the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya.[49]

Apart from advocating a common defence policy, the UK has also been involved in promoting the creation of two other initiatives within the CSDP. The first was a Franco-British initiative that led to the creation of the EU battle groups in 2004. These are eighteen battalion-sized multinational military units that are made up of contributions from Member States. They rotate so that two groups are ready to deploy at all times and are under the control of the Council of the EU. Participants at a Franco-British summit at Le Touquet in 2003 suggested that the EU establish a defence capabilities development agency.[50] This emerged in 2004 as the European Defence Agency (EDA) and was first headed by former director general of the UK's Ministry of Defence, Nick Whitney. The aim of the agency was defined as developing defence capabilities in the field of crisis management, promoting and enhancing European armaments cooperation, strengthening the European industrial and technological base and creating a competitive European Defence market.[51]

Many have been critical of the CSDP for failing to reach its full potential, in part because of its perceived slow and at times fragmented response. Thierry Tardy of the EUISS has defined much of what the CSDP does as 'sub-strategic'.[52] Karen E. Smith has said it mainly relates to 'small-scale mission that are not the main expression of a strategy and do not drive major changes in the recipient state or region'.[53]

Some critics would link the lack of a more cohesive and integrated CSDP to the UK, given that the UK has opposed some forms of further defence or security integration that others have advocated within the Union. The best known is the UK's opposition to the creation of a permanent operational headquarters to provide command and control for EU missions and operations using the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) mechanism. This mechanism is specified in the Treaty of Lisbon and allows for groups of EU Member States to undertake deeper defence collaboration even if all Member States do not wish to participate. This is decided on through a qualified majority in the Council.[54]

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on-the-common-foreign-and-security-policy/section-2-provisions-on-the-common-security-and-defence-policy/129-article-42.html

[48] http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Chaillot_134_CSDP_missions.pdf

[49] For a full list, see https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en

[50]http://ec.europa.eu/dorie/fileDownload.do;jsessionid=lBpNTk1G52mDpQslLFk2vY9Y79K2QKDZ8MrMj1GGjysBzzJ7cLbc!-750017855?docId=125359&cardId=125359

[51] Ammier Sarhan, European Defence Cooperation: Striving for an Ever Closer Union, p.19

[52] http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Chaillot_134_CSDP_missions.pdf

[53] http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/07/02/would-brexit-spell-the-end-of-european-defence/

[54] http://theconversation.com/why-the-eu-is-suddenly-marching-to-a-different-drumbeat-on-defence-65588

Then Foreign Secretary William Hague in 2011 explained the UK opposition to this, saying any proposal would trigger a veto from the UK. He said 'we are opposed to this idea because we think it duplicates NATO structures and permanently disassociates EU planning from NATO planning…a lot can be done by improving the structures that already exist.'[55] Instead, Hague suggested that European governments improve links between national HQs and ask for contribution from military commanders earlier in planning military operations.

In acknowledgment of the UK's opposition to this, a communiqué in 2012 from 11 EU Member States, including France and Germany, called for a new model defence policy, designed to create a 'European Army' and more majority based decision-making in defence and foreign policy in order to 'prevent one single Member State from being able to obstruct initiatives'.[56] Former Prime Minister David Cameron highlighted the UK's staunch opposition to this idea in 2016, saying 'national security is a national competence, and we would veto any suggestion of an EU army'.[57]

The UK's opposition to the idea of an EU operational HQ is in part doctrinal, but also due to the potential risk this poses for the ease of manoeuvring between NATO and EU-led missions. For example, Operation Althea, a capacity building and training programme for authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was originally a NATO Stabilisation Force operation. This was concluded in 2004 and subsequently transitioned to a European Union Force (EUFOR) operation. Operation Althea is still conducted with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.[58] British General Sir Adrian Bradshaw served in 2014 as both the EU Operation Commander and the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) for NATO for Operation Althea.[59] Therefore, a more integrated EU military component, if it was not compatible with or duplicated aspects of NATO, would make the CSDP less effective.

The UK has also resisted some other proposals. For example, the UK rejected the French proposal for a permanent EU fund for financing armed operations.[60] In 2013, before an EU summit on defence, European military and security experts drew up plans to send an EU battle group on a mission for the first time, intended to go into the Central African Republic (CAR) to support France's mission there. However, the UK, which was leading the battle group at the time, did not support the idea. As a result, France refrained from raising the issue at the summit.[61] Carnegie Europe's Judy Dempsey has argued that this was already because of the planned referendum on the EU in the UK. The UK government did not want to 'give the country's Eurosceptics any additional leverage'.[62] Until November 2016, the UK has rejected increases in the EDA's budget for five years in a row.[63]

That is not to say the UK is against enhancing effectiveness of the CSDP through closer cooperation. The UK's SDSR particularly emphasises the UK's desire to foster closer coordination and cooperation between the EU and NATO, and it echoes the EU Global

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[55] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/8645749/Britain-blocks-EU-plans-for-operational-military-headquarters.html

[56] 'Ministers call for stronger EU foreign policy chief", *EU Observer,* 18 September 2012.

[57] https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-on-the-uks-strength-and-security-in-the-eu-9-may-2016

[58] http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/althea-bih/pdf/factsheet_eufor_althea_en.pdf

[59] https://www.shape.nato.int/page39511625

[60] https://www.ft.com/content/230c8198-671a-11e3-a5f9-00144feabdc0

[61] http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=53975

[62] http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=53975

[63] https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Brexit%20Report%20February%202016.pdf

Strategy's desire to focus on a full-spectrum approach through this cooperation to counter cyber and other 'hybrid threats'.[64] It emphasises the need to make the EU more competitive and flexible, which is something other EU leaders have advocated. Yet it is still resistant to truly integrative measures, in part for political and ideological reasons. The UK has also been frustrated at other EU Member States' lack of investment into improving their own capabilities.[65]

To most, the UK's departure from the EU therefore opens up opportunities for pushing through plans that will allow for further integration and commitment to EU-wide approaches on defence and security. This, over time, could make the UK's participation in CSDP initiatives more complex and makes the UK more of an outsider in terms of the substance of its cooperation. On the other hand, given that the UK provides some assistance that is significant to the CSDP operations, as will be discussed, negotiations could lead to continued and unchanged cooperation on those aspects that are mutually beneficial.

What the UK will lose post-Brexit

By leaving the EU, the immediate loss implication in terms of CFSP and CSDP will be the UK's role and influence in the decision-making process for missions and operations. The decision-making for this is quite complex, and affects multiple levels within the EU structure.

The EU allocates a CFSP budget, out of which civilian CSDP missions and operations are financed. The European Council, consisting of the heads of EU Member States, and the Council of the European Union, including ministers of the EU Member States, are responsible for taking decisions on CSDP, and such decisions are taken unanimously. The Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) of the European Commission administers the CFSP budget. FPI is also responsible for the 'Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace and Foreign Policy Regulatory Instruments (Crisis Response and Peace Building)' (ICSP). The ICSP does provide short-term CFSP programmes where Commission Programmes are not mandated or able to respond.[66]

The FPI works alongside the foreign policy department of the EU, the European External Action Service (EEAS). EEAS leads on CFSP, including CSDP. There are some CSDP structures within the EEAS, which are relevant to planning of civilian missions. These include the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), European Union Military Staff (EUMS), the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD). These three are crucial to CSDP mission planning and conduct.

- CPCC operationally plans and runs civilian CSDP Missions. It supports CMPD in the development of Civilian Strategic Options if required. It also prepares the draft mission budget with FPI. It coordinates with the Commission to help work on comprehensive approach, and works with the EUMS to identify and implement civil-military coordination requirements.
- EUMS provides military strategic and advance planning.
- CMPD is an integrated civilian-military that is in charge of conducting strategic and advance planning for new CSDP missions or operations. It is also in charge of

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[64]https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/555607/2015_Strategic_Defence_and_Security_Review.pdf
[65] *Key Controversies in European Integration,* edited by Hubert Zimmermann, Andreas Dur
[66] 'Working in European Union Common Security and Defence Policy Missions', Deployee Guide, Stabilisation Unit, October 2014.

conducting strategic reviews of existing CSDP missions and operations. It is also the coordinating body of EU-NATO and EU-Un dialogue on CSDP.

Military operations are financed by a separate method, called ATHENA. This is funded by Member States contributions, calculated on the basis of size of national economies. Military operations are run from ad hoc activated military OHQs.

The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is a permanent body composed of representatives of the 28 Member States at Ambassadorial level. The Treaty of Lisbon provides that the PSC shall 'exercise, under the responsibility of the Council and High Representative, the political control and strategic direction of the crisis management operations'. The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is composed of the member states' Chiefs of Defence. It directs all military activities and provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on military matters. The Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) provides information, formulates recommendations and gives advice on the civilian aspects of crisis management to the PSC.

This highlights the multiple areas where membership to the EU, and contributed personnel, can influence decisions and act as checks and balances on the priorities. Not only will the UK lose the option to act in these various bodies, but it will also lose EU membership as a platform to encourage EU action on issues in its own national interests. For example, in October 2014 then Prime Minister David Cameron used the European Council meeting to encourage the EU to step up international cooperation to combat the spread of Ebola.[67] This resulted in David Cameron securing a EUR 1 billion funding pledge from the EU, as the UK increased its own financial support by GBP 80m.[68] The UK's funding went to other organisations working there, such as the International Federation of Red Cross and the Un Multi-Partner Trust fund, demonstrating how the EU is a useful platform for pushing priorities and gaining real material support for non-EU initiatives.

The UK will also lose the influence EU membership provides on matters it views as important to European security. The UK has been a strong advocate of sanctions on Russia in the wake of its aggression in Ukraine, which has provided reassurance to Eastern countries in the EU. The UK MOD has said 'to date the EU is our primary tool for reducing vulnerability to Russian malign influence'.[69] Although there is much more work to be done on a more cohesive EU approach towards Russia, this will again be an area that the UK will be unable to influence. This will also have negative knock-on effects for other member states, as some of the Eastern European countries had welcomed the UK's strong stance. Upon the vote to leave the EU, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Lina Linkevicius expressed concerns that 'the voices of the more principled positions will be weaker' within the EU when it comes to dealing with Russia as a result of the UK's departure. Therefore, Lithuania was not 'rushing to expel Britain' from the Union.[70]

How could the UK still participate and have influence?

Participation is something that the UK government would seemingly like to continue. Some have noted that there seems to be a working assumption that, given the shared interests in

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[67] https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/european-council-october-2014-david-camerons-speech
[68] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-secures-1-billion-european-ebola-commitment
[69] https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/538442/MOD_ARAc_2015-16_Final_print_version__2_.pdf
[70] http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/lithuania-seeks-to-preserve-uk-ally-against-russia/

security between the EU and the UK and the contribution made by the UK, defence and security cooperation will simply continue.[71] This assumption is unlikely to be popular amongst EU member states during negotiations.

Theresa May and her Cabinet have stated that the UK will seek to cooperate closely with EU partners on security and defence. However, a key emphasis on foreign and security policy generally that may be extrapolated towards future CSDP cooperation has been the desire to further prioritise UK national interests. As Malcolm Chalmers of RUSI has noted, Theresa May has 'been clear in her view that national interest should be the main driver for UK foreign and security policy'.[72] He quotes Nick Timothy, one of Theresa May's aides during her time at the Home Office and now one of her two Chiefs of Staff as Prime Minister, to emphasize this viewpoint:

'we need to rediscover the principles of a traditional, realist, conservative foreign policy. Value stability. Respect sovereignty. Do not make foreign policy part of an ideological crusade. Do not try to recreate the world in your own image ... Always act on the basis of the national interest.'[73]

Secretary of State for Defence Sir Michael Fallon has echoed this, saying that Brexit should not inhibit future cooperation with missions that are in the national interest.[74] The key question is therefore what this might look like, and how negotiations might play either in the UK's favour, the EU's favour or for mutual benefit based on what the UK currently contributes.

This could see the UK potentially withdraw from certain operations. The Royal Navy has contributed significant presence and capability to the EU naval operation in the Mediterranean. Peter Roberts of RUSI has said 'participation in this mission was a clear political signal from London that it was aligned to the values of the EU and the concerns of European partner states. It was not, however, based on a national security concern directly. The UK's national interests and policy regarding migration are highly differentiated from that of Europe.' Re-examination of resources, commitments and priorities might well see the UK alter its participation in initiatives to deal with migration in the Mediterranean, possibly pushing for a greater NATO or UN presence. Such a decision would be a clear indication of the path that London is taking, and mark a departure from Europe in security matters.

In reality, the UK could still participate in EU missions and operations, despite their likely loss of influence in the decision-making. The Berlin Plus format allows for non-EU countries to engage. Canada, Norway and the US have implemented framework agreements that allow them to participate in EU military and civilian crisis management operations.

European Defence Agency

Outside of the EU the UK would no longer have a seat on the Steering Board of the European Defence Agency, which is made up of defence ministers from participating Member States, and would not have a say on how the EDA is run or the projects it focuses on. A study by Cranfield University in 2015 noted the influence that the UK could have in this agency, concluding that it 'enables the UK to influence coherent capability development across

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[71] 'National Interest at the Heart of Security Policy', Malcolm Chalmers
[72] 'National Interest at the Heart of Security Policy', Malcolm Chalmers
[73] Nick Timothy, 'The Chilcot Report is finally coming, but we already know we haven't learnt the lessons of Iraq', *Conservative Home*, 31 May 2016.
[74] House of Lords, Library Notes, Leaving the European Union: Foreign and Security Policy Cooperation, October 2016

member states, 22 of which are also in NATO' and brought 'the ability to influence European defence industry initiatives' which helped to reduce the cost of defence capability.[75] A UK withdrawal from the organisation would also save contribution to common costs, which in 2014-15 amounted to GBP 3.319m.[76] The UK could, however, continue participating in EDA projects as a third party country.[77] For example, in 2006 Norway signed an administrative agreement with the EDA, which allows it to participate in the Agency's research and technology projects.

The UK shifted its approach to the EDA, possibly as a demonstration of goodwill but also as a possible reflection that the EDA is not considered a core priority. In November 2016 the EU agreed to increase its military research budget for the first time since 2010, raising the funding in 2017 by 1.6% and taking the budget to EUR 31m. As already mentioned, the UK had previously blocked any such increase five years in a row. In reality, this keeps the agency's budget at 2016's level in real terms, but Federica Mogherini was optimistic saying 'it is still a symbolic increase…it is a clear demonstration of all EU member states, including the United Kingdom, to increase the budget of the agency to reflect the work to be done'.[78]

There is also the option of cooperation through the Letter of Intent (LoI) Framework Agreement (FA) Treaty, which was signed in 2000 by the defence ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK. This aimed to create the legal framework to assist industrial restructuring with the objective of promoting a more competitive and robust European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, particularly concentrating on security of supply, transfer/export procedures, security of information, treatment of technical information, research and harmonisation of military requirements.[79] Although the EDA overtook this framework, the agreement is still in place. Nick Whitney has argued that LoIs could be reinstated as a way for the UK to participate, although an agreement would need to be made so that such a framework would not undermine the EDA. He suggest that the LoI group could use the EDA as a secretariat, so their activity is visible to, and known by, EDA members.[80]

Bilateral

Although not directly related to EU-UK relations, the Brexit debate has emphasized the UK's ability to continue cooperation on security and defence through its strong bilateral relations. The UK's SDSR particularly emphasizes key bilateral defence and security relationships with France, Germany and Poland. The EU itself is listed after NATO, US, France, Germany and specific European partners in the SDSR.[81]

Defence relations with France have historically been strong. The Lancaster House treaties, signed in 2010, agreed to develop a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) involving all three armed Services as well as cooperate further on developing equipment and capabilities.[82] In April 2016 the UK and French Armed Forces tested the CJEF by conducting Exercise Griffin Strike in Salisbury Plain Training Area as well as at sea. This aimed at testing equipment,

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[75] House of Commons, 'Written Statement: European Defence Agency Membership Review', 12 February 2013.

[76] House of Commons, 'Written Question: European Defence Agency', 18 December 2015

[77] http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7213

[78] http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-defence-idUKKBN13A29J

[79] https://www.gov.uk/guidance/letter-of-intent-restructuring-the-european-defence-industry

[80] http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_brexit_and_defence_time_to_dust_off_the_letter_of_intent7075

[81] https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/555607/2015_Strategic_Defence_and_Security_Review.pdf

[82] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-france-defence-co-operation-treaty-announced--2

procedural and interoperability training using vehicles and equipment from both countries together.[83] In February 2016, a French Brigadier-General was appointed deputy commander of a British army division for the first time, and a British Officer Colonel took up a similar role in the French Army.[84] At a UK-France summit in March 2016 both sides agreed to continue inter-operability by launching a new project under the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), which will see the development of unmanned air vehicle prototypes through an investment of USD 2.2 billion. This builds on a feasibility study phase, which began in November 2014.[85]

The UK specifically mentioned Germany as a partner. In January 2016 a new UK-Germany Ministerial Dialogue on Capability Cooperation was announced to drive forward reductions in support costs to common aircraft, in particular A400M and Typhoon. In Germany's own White Paper also specifically mentions the UK, saying that Germany aims to 'further expand in all areas of common interest'.[86]

Another new variable in the UK's own defence and security policy with the US is how relations will emerge with the Trump Administration. The UK's SDSR confirms Britain's 'special relationship' with the US as leading economic and defence powers. It argues that the 'unparalleled extent of UK–US cooperation on nuclear, intelligence, diplomacy, technology and military capabilities plays a major role in guaranteeing our national security'.[87]

The election of Donald Trump as US President may create some uncertainty as to the future direction of UK-US relations, but historically the UK has pursued greater inter-operability with the US over that of EU member states. As Peter Roberts of RUSI has said 'the UK has consistent specified equipment compatible with the US forces over that simply for European partners'. For example, the 2015 SDSR did emphasize US-UK interoperability through collaboration on aircraft carrier programmes, with a stated goal of achieving the ability 'to fly aircraft from each other's ships'.[88] In 2016 the UK also purchased nine Boeing P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, originally developed for the US Navy.[89]

Trump has caused concern in Europe and within NATO by saying that he would only support member states on NATO's Article 5 if they paid their 'fare share' of 2% defence spending.[90] Although the reality of Trump's defence policy is as yet unclear, EU-US alignment may diverge without the UK as a member. This could leave the UK in an awkward position in between, or it could also present an opportunity for the UK, given a potential role as go-between for the EU and US.

Nevertheless, this may provide impetus for the EU to focus on security and defence. German defence minister Ursula von der Leyen said EU security would continue to depend on the US and NATO, but Trump's victory meant that Europe would have to be 'more self-reliant on

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[83] http://www.army.mod.uk/news/28518.aspx
[84] https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/feb/08/french-brigadier-general-to-become-deputy-commander-in-british-army
[85] https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/new-22-billion-anglo-french-fcas-phase-announced-422866/
[86] http://www.new-york-un.diplo.de/contentblob/4847754/Daten/6718448/160713weibuchEN.pdf
[87] https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/555607/2015_Strategic_Defence_and_Security_Review.pdf
[88] https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478933/52309_Cm_9161_NSS_SD_Review_web_only.pdf
[89] http://www.janes.com/article/62159/farnborough-2016-uk-orders-p-8-poseidon-maritime-patrol-aircraft
[90] https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jul/27/donald-trump-nato-isolationist

security issues'. She said NATO was still 'the cornerstone of our collective defence', but that the EU should have 'strategic autonomy'.[91]

Other Multilateral

The UK remains a member of the Organisation of Joint Armament Cooperation (Organisation conjointe de coopération en matière d'armement or OCCAR). This is an intergovernmental organisation that was created in 1996 by the defence ministers of France, Germany, Italy and the UK. It currently involves collaborative armament programmes between Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. It does allow non-OCCAR members to participate in OCCAR-managed programmes.[92] OCCAR's current programmes with UK participation include the A400M tactical and strategic airlift, the Maritime Mine Counter Measures and the FSAF-PAAMS surface-to-air anti-missile systems.[93]

The UK's 2015 SDSR stresses that 'NATO is at the heart of the UK's defence policy'.[94] The UK will continue to be a strong contributor to NATO, if not strengthen this contribution. The UK has taken an active role in reassuring NATO partners to the East, some of which are also EU members. In 2014, RAF Typhoon aircraft were deployed to Lithuania to take part in the enhanced Baltic Air Policing mission, alongside Poland, Denmark and France. In November 2015, the UK, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Norway signed a Foundation Memorandum of Understanding on the Joint Expeditionary Force, and in 2015 2,500 UK personnel were deployed on exercises in the three Baltic States and Poland as part of NATO's Assurance Measures. Even since the referendum, the UK has committee 500 troops to Estonia and 150 to Poland to reassure these NATO allies.[95]

At the Warsaw summit, NATO and the EU agreed to work closer together, allowing the UK some engagement with EU defence and security through NATO post-Brexit. A joint declaration was signed during the Warsaw summit in July 2016 between the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary General of NATO. This pledged to work closer together on analysis, prevention and early detection of hybrid threat; cooperating on strategic communication and response; broaden cooperation operationally, particularly at sea to combat the migration crisis; increase collaboration on cyber security and defence; stronger defence research and industrial cooperation; coordinate exercises, particularly on hybrid; strengthen defence and security capacity in the East and South.[96]

The UK has also been influential in multilateral issues, such as the Iran deal. The UK had double strength in these negotiations as both a member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the EU. France, Germany and the UK were prominent EU members that led on the negotiations from the European perspective, but they were also part of the E3+3 format, which also involved Russia, China and the US. The UK would still exert influence through its UNSC seat but will lose the EU influence.

What might the EU lose if the UK cannot/does not participate at all in the CSDP?

[91] https://euobserver.com/foreign/135877
[92] http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede030909occarwelcome_/sede030909occarwelcome_en.pdf
[93] http://www.occar.int/programmes
[94] https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/555607/2015_Strategic_Defence_and_Security_Review.pdf
[95] http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-36739781
[96] http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133163.htm

It is difficult to find exact figures of how much the UK provides to EU missions and operations in terms of spending, UK personnel, equipment and expertise. Numerous government departments and law enforcement agencies, such as the MOD, National Crime Agency (NCA), FCO and DfID work on EU-related missions and operations but also provide bilateral support to host countries. Often the differentiation between EU and bilateral contributions is not clear.

According to a House of Commons research briefing in August 2016 the UK share in military operations made up 14.82% of common costs.[97] Information provided by the FCO to a European Union Committee report in February 2016 indicate that the UK contributes approximately 16% of CFSP budget that funds civilian missions.[98] The UK does spend 2% of GDP on defence, making it one of the five EU member states meeting the NATO spending commitment on public defence, including Greece, Poland, France and Estonia.[99] In its recent White Paper, Germany did say it aims to spend two per cent on defence and to invest 20% of this amount in major equipment over the long term.[100]

A variable in this will be how much the economic impact of Brexit affects the UK's ability to spend this amount. The budget in the 2015-2016 MOD annual report is given as GBP 35.3 billion.[101] The MOD has earmarked to spend £178 billion on defence equipment over the next ten years until 2025.[102] However, Brexit could raise concerns on how the budget will be affected by any subsequent economic challenges. In August 2016, Trevor Taylor of RUSI has said that if the UK pound stays weak, then Britain's defence imports could increase by approximately £700m per annum from 2018-19.[103] Malcolm Chalmers has also said that defence could be included in any expenditure cuts that might result from Brexit.[104] This could in particular affect the UK MOD's Equipment and Support Plan.[105]

In terms of personnel, the UK is by no means the largest contributor, but it is still a significant one. The UK's overall field personnel for CSDP civilian and military operations is rather low at 5-7% of all total deployed personnel.[106] It ranks fifth among the contributors to CSDP military operations, after France, Italy, Germany and Spain, and seventh for civilian missions, after Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, France and Finland.[107] Appendix 1 shows the details submitted by the FCO to the Lords Select Committee on the European Union regarding UK contribution to CDSP military operations and civilian missions 2007-2015.[108]

There are some missions of note regarding UK contributions. The first is the UK's role in the European Union Naval Force anti-piracy operation Atalanta (EU NAVFOR Atalanta; Atalanta)

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[97] http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7213

[98] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/97/9714.htm

[99] https://www.ceps.eu/publications/implications-brexit-eu%E2%80%99s-common-security-and-defence-policy

[100] http://www.new-york-un.diplo.de/contentblob/4847754/Daten/6718448/160713weibuchEN.pdf

[101] https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/538442/MOD_ARAc_2015-16_Final_print_version__2_.pdf

[102] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/strategic-defence-and-security-review-178bn-of-equipment-spending

[103] https://rusi.org/commentary/MoD-post-brexit-spending-power-assumptions-numbers-calculations-and

[104] http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2016/06/02/brexit-defense-cuts/85304940/

[105] https://rusi.org/commentary/brexit-and-uk-defence-put-equipment-plan-hold

[106] https://euobserver.com/opinion/134256

[107] https://www.ceps.eu/publications/implications-brexit-eu%E2%80%99s-common-security-and-defence-policy

[108] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/97/9714.htm

in Somalia.[109] This is a counter-piracy operation off the Horn of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean. The operational headquarters is located at Northwood in the UK. This is one of the UK's strengths, as it is one of only five EU countries capable of deploying an operational HQ for EU-led missions, along with France, Germany, Greece and Italy.[110] The UK also provided a frigate for this mission five months in both 2009 and 2011 and two Royal fleet Auxiliary vessels for a month each in 2013.[111] This demonstrates how EU cooperation can work towards defending UK national interests, given that the seas off the coast of Somalia area a key trade route for the UK between Europe and Asia whilst also upholding and promoting EU values abroad. Although this is not a priority exclusive to the UK, the shared cost coverage is significant in support of UK interests. As of 2013, other EU member states provide over 80% of the operation's costs.[112]

Another significant contribution was made for EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia. HMS Bulwark rescued 4,747 migrants in May-July 2015. The UK also provided the survey ship HMS Enterprise. When further assets were requested, the UK provided the frigate HMS Richmond with a lynx helicopter, ScanEagle UAV and Royal Marines boarding party. Thus, the UK provided two of the nine ships at the height of the surge in assets. The UK also led in the UN Security Council on the adoption of UNSCR 2240 which confirmed the international community's support for the operation.[113]

In Mali, the UK has provided legal advisors, infantry training and artillery training teams with the EU Training Mission, the first mandate of which was established in February 2013. It seeks to train the Malian Armed Forces.[114] The UK delivers a 'train the trainer' programme to enable the Malian Armed Forces to become more self-sufficient. This is an interesting example, because the UK has also provided support to France's unilateral intervention into Mali, which took place in January 2013 at the request of Mali's president. The RAF C-17 mission, codenamed Operation Newcombe, provides France with the RAF's lift capability, transporting heavy equipment and supplies. The French air force does not have aircraft as big as the UK's C-17s to conduct such transport operations.[115] This demonstrates the way in which the UK in principle aligns with the values of the EU CSDP and CFSP, given it is clearly willing to have a more collective and pooled capability approach.

This is by no means an exhaustive account of what the UK has contributed to missions and operations, but highlights some of the ones where the UK has been most engaged. The UK has also cooperated where it sees its specialist skills are appropriate. For example, the UK National Crime Agency and City of London Economic Crime Academy provide training to the Security Service of Ukraine as part of EUAM Ukraine. For Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the UK MOD contributed an Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance Taskforce to the operation between July 2014 and March 2015 following civil unrest in February 2014. Key UK strengths in the military operations include tactical airlift and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets. The UK has also provided leadership and HQ staff. For example, the current Operation Commander of Operation Atalanta off the coast of Somalia was Major General Rob Magowan CBE, Royal Marines.[116] As of March 2016, the UK had 16 embedded

[109] http://eunavfor.eu/
[110] http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7213
[111] http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/may/eu-uk-jha-fa-coop.pdf
[112] http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/may/eu-uk-jha-fa-coop.pdf
[113] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmeuleg/342-xx/34214.htm
[114] https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/538442/MOD_ARAc_2015-16_Final_print_version__2_.pdf
[115] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/mali/9813503/Mali-conflict-how-British-forces-are-helping-France-tackle-Africas-Islamists.html
[116] http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2016/06/defence-implications-brexit-thoughts/

HQ staff in EU HQs.[117]

Indications of the EU's future plans

Although it is not necessarily always the most prominent actor, the UK clearly plays a constructive role in the EU's CSDP. The UK has expressed a strong desire to stay engaged where it can on the EU's defence and security policy. However, the UK's ability to will also depend on the trajectory the EU's own defence and security policy takes.

Firstly, certain EU member states have tabled the idea of a European Army more seriously with the prospect of Brexit. On 8 September 2016, whilst speaking in Lithuania, German defence minister Ursula von der Leyen called for a European 'defence union' of 1,000 troops to deter Russian aggression in Eastern Europe, intended to 'add value' to NATO.[118] Whether she was serious, or seeking to reassure Eastern allies, she dubbed this a 'Schengen of defence', justifying such an initiative by saying 'that is what the Americans expect us to do'.[119] Ahead of the defence ministers' meeting in Bratislava on 27 September 2016, the Italian government proposed a 'joint permanent European Multinational Force' so that member states can share forces, command and control, manoeuvre and enable capabilities. It also sought a new EU military HQ for the force.[120]

On 12 September 2016 Germany seemed to pull back from the idea of a European Army as Ursula von der Leyen produced an informal joint report with French defence minister Jean-Yves Le Drian.[121]Rather than advocating integrated armed forces, it revisited the idea of an EU military HQ, with its own medical and logistical assets, such as air-lift equipment. The aim would be to create a new command centre for coordinating medical assistance, a logistics centre for sharing 'strategic assets' and capacity to share satellite reconnaissance data. The plan also advocated that Battlegroups should be made operationally ready and also calls for a single EU budget for military research and joint procurement of assets. They said that this would start the creation of a 'real' common security policy, 'an instrument created by the Lisbon Treaty that has not been used until today'.

Jean-Claude Juncker also supported this idea. In his State of the Union address in September 2016 Juncker expressed his support for a single operational HQ and for the EU to establish common military assets, as well as a shared European Defence Fund.[122] The Franco-German proposal did, however, reiterate that the 'political responsibility for defence lies in the first place with member states'.[123]

In a bid to formalise the further development of the CSDP, on 14 November 2016 Federica Mogherini - who holds the posts of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Vice-President of the European Commission and Head of the EDA - sent a proposal to the EU Council outlining the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence.[124] This aims to define how the security and defence dimension of the recently published EU Global Strategy (EUGS) will be implemented.[125]

[117]https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/538442/MOD_ARAc_2015-16_Final_print_version__2_.pdf

[118] http://www.dw.com/en/in-lithuania-von-der-leyen-backs-eu-defense-union/a-19537386

[119] http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-defence-germany-lithuania-idUSKCN11E1FL

[120] https://euobserver.com/foreign/135235

[121] https://euobserver.com/foreign/135022

[122] http://ec.europa.eu/news/2016/09/20160914_en.html

[123] https://euobserver.com/foreign/135041

[124] EUGS Implementation Plan, 14 November 2016

[125] https://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf

This implementation plan identifies the weaknesses in the current approach to CSDP and provides action points as a way to improve them. It particularly identifies the need for 'deepening defence cooperation and delivering the required capabilities together' as well as the need for the CSDP to be backed up by 'credible, deployable, interoperable, sustainable and multifunctional civilian and military capabilities'. Some of the most relevant include:

1) EEAS to make proposals for Member States' consideration on revisiting the current priority areas for civilian CSDP missions in light of the changing security environment. There is a specific mention of countering hybrid threats, through building joint capacities in things like cyber and maritime security.
2) Deepening defence cooperation and reversing the fragmentation of the EU's defence sector to enhance collective output. The ultimate goal would be to set up a Coordinated Annual Review on Defence in order to share national plans and intentions for defence spending and how they could be linked with a common effort, as well as identifying gaps in capabilities.
3) EDA should develop proposals on how better to produce more structured and effective cooperation as well as better aligning Research & Technology efforts.
4) Review structures and capabilities available for planning and conduct of CSDP missions and operations, enhancing civilian and military synergies in particular.
5) Enhance the EU's Rapid Response toolbox, including enhancing the common funding for the EU Battlegroups and conducting regular 'live' civilian-military exercises.
6) Provide for more comprehensive and shared financing, as well as mobilising budgets more flexibly.
7) Explore the potential of a single and inclusive Permanent Structure Cooperation, covering commitments on defence expenditures, capability development and operational engagement.
8) Enhance CSDP partnerships with organisations such as the UN, NATO, OSCE and the African Union.[126]

Most recently, on 22 November 2016, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) passed a resolution on the European Defence Union, in which they suggested devoting 2% of GDP to defence, establishing multinational forces and an EU headquarters to plan and command crisis management operations, in order to enable the EU to act where NATO will not. The resolution was approved by 369 votes to 255, with 70 abstentions. Central to the resolution was the pooling of military resources, whereby the EDA should have a strengthened coordinating role, the EU should establish multinational forces within the Permanent Structured Cooperation and make them available to the common security and defence policy, and the creation of a separate European Defence Research Programme with an annual budget of €500 million. MEPs will debate a separate resolution on CSDP on Tuesday 29 November and vote the following day on a draft text that currently suggests 'radically overhauling CSDP and launching a training operation in Iraq to support EU Member States involved in the coalition against Daesh'.[127]

If the EU does implement fundamental changes to the civilian missions and military operations of the CSDP and makes EU defence and security more robust and integrated, then it could diminish the UK's influence further given it would sit outside the decision-making structures.

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[126] EUGS Implementation Plan, 14 November 2016
[127] http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20161117IPR51547/defence-meps-push-for-more-eu-cooperation-to-better-protect-europe

Some have been sceptical that removing the UK from the equation will be enough to address other fundamental issues that are hindering further EU defence and security integration and cooperation, however. As Daniel Keohane has said '…although it is hardly fair to blame the UK alone for the union's disappointing military performance, EU defence cheerleaders have seized on Brexit as a golden chance to re-launch the policy. Given the substantial differences between the remaining 27 regarding their strategic cultures, security priorities and attitudes to the use of military force…sceptics could be forgiven for thinking that EU defence will continue to promise lots but deliver little.'

Some challenges remain, and there will be limits of the political will towards further defence and security union. Without the UK, countries such as Austria and Ireland, who are also resistant to full defence and security integration, will lose a champion on the issue. True interoperability will continue to be an issue unless further military integration is accomplished. For example, there are 19 different types of armoured infantry fighting vehicles across the EU. The United States has one. However, such integration could mean detrimentally affect the dynamism and trade of the EU defence procurement market.

Foreign policy approaches also differ. The French defence minister recently said that the EU should send military ships to ensure open waterways in the territorially disputed South China Sea. France has demonstrated that it is willing to act unilaterally in military affairs, as demonstrated by the interventions in Mali and the Central African Republic in 2013-2014. Such interventionist action is at odds with some states' approach. Germany is certainly becoming more proactive in military and defence affairs. For example, after the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, Germany sent a frigate and reconnaissance aircraft to support the anti-ISIS coalition in Iraq and Syria. However, it is still unlikely to back such adventurist foreign policy. This means that limits to the expeditions that the EU can make on the basis of a collective approach will remain with or without the UK.

This scepticism may be felt in Whitehall, but Keohane also offers a useful warning. He goes on to say 'the skeptics, however, may be misjudging the combination of the post-Brexit political mood and an increasing awareness among EU governments that they sometimes need to fend for themselves'.[128] The rapid efforts by EU leaders and member state ministers to discuss how EU security and defence might be shaped post-Brexit, without Britain, highlight this mood.

Conclusion

The difficulty will be how to frame and structure the defence and security relationship without losing the benefits of cooperation, whilst also not encouraging further departures from the EU through maintaining the status quo. Nick Whitney has phrased this well, saying '…whether the politics will actually permit mutually-beneficial defence cooperation to continue remains to be seen. But if common sense and forbearance do reassert themselves, some sort of privileged partnership between the UK and EU looks like a reasonable goal – the sort of thing NATO has with friendly 'neutrals' such as Sweden and Finland. The snag is, how could the EU offer that to the UK without also offering it to Norway (no problem), Turkey (big problem) and even Ukraine? How to define it, and to embody it, as would be necessary, in treaty change?'[129]

Information sharing could be initially considered a low hanging fruit – with countries like Norway, Switzerland, and Lichtenstein fully integrated in intelligence sharing platforms and databases. However, there are, admittedly, concessions that have had to be made for the

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[128] http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=64584
[129] http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_brexit_and_defence_time_to_dust_off_the_letter_of_intent7075

access that has been granted. So far, all participating countries have either been Schengen states or are fully-fledged EU member states. The recent string of terrorist plots that have been foiled and the failures to prevent others due to a lapse in efficient cooperation should point toward the benefit of being part of intelligence sharing networks and platforms. However, as Bernard Squarcini has stated, there must be political will – and trust – for information to be readily shared.[130] On the flip-side of this, Jean-Marie Delarue hit the nail on the head when he noted that 'information is power. In intelligence, one only has enemies'.[131]

The platforms exist and the data is there. Attacks successfully carried out within Europe has pointed towards intelligence sharing failures – within the EU, whether within its member states, amongst them and with third parties. Whether EU legislation in its current form permits it or not, the EU will steadily have to find creative ways of facilitating effective and efficient intelligence sharing, while guaranteeing that citizen rights are protected and the information is not abused. This will also be the case when the UK looks towards its future role in European security missions outside of European borders. Although the UK has a special relationships with its partners in the Five Eyes agreement, and undoubtedly this will continue to play a role, it is clear that the UK has actively played a role in – and benefited from – shaping EU security cooperation, and vice versa. The question, then, is to what extent will either side recognize that using this as a bargaining chip during possible Brexit negotiations could ultimately end in a race to the bottom that serves none. At the end of the day, 5 eyes are great, 27 are better, but 28 remains the number to beat.

Appendix 1

CSDP Military Operations 2007-2015: UK Contributions

Operation	Summary	Dates	Total Personnel	UK Personnel/Resources	Total Annual Budget	UK Contribution
EUFOR Althea	Capacity building and training to Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina	Dec 2004 – present	803	1 x intermediate reserve company (up to 120 personnel)\n\n6 x staff officers	EUR 14.1m	EUR 2.2m
EU NAVFOR ATALANTA	Protects vessels in Somalia, deters and disrupts piracy and armed robbery at sea and monitors fishing activities off the coast of Somalia	Dec 2008 – present	c. 1051	Hosts Operational HQ (Northwood)\n\nOperation Commander Maj Gen Martin Smith RM and core OHQ staff	EUR 7.4m	EUR 1.2m
EUTM Somalia	Contributes to strengthening the	April 2010 -	171	1 x Logistics Officer;	EUR 11.3m	EUR 1.8m

130 http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/24/world/europe/as-terrorists-cross-borders-europe-sees-anew-that-its-intelligence-does-not.html?_r=0
131 Ibid.

	Transitional Federal Government in Somalia	present		1 x MA to Somali CHOD 1 x Civilian Security Sector Reform Advisor		
EUTM Mali	Trains and advises the Malian Armed Forces (MAF).	Feb 2013 – present	578	3 x Force HQ staff; 27 x Training Team personnel; 2 x Civilian Humanitarian Law trainers	EUR 15.0m	EUR 2.4m
EUMAM RCA	Plays a role in strengthening the security sector in close co-operation with the UN.	April 2014 – present	c. 700	None	EUR 29.6m	EUR 4.4m
EUNAVFOR MED (Op Sophia)	Contributes to disrupting the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Mediterranean.	June 2015 – present	1137	2 x Royal Navy Vessels; core OHQ staff (subject to review 30 November)	EUR 7.5m	EUR 1.2m

CSDP Civilian Operations 2007–2015: UK Contributions

Operation	Summary	Dates	Total Personnel	UK Personnel	Total Annual Budget	UK Contribution
EUPOL Afghanistan	Supports the Afghan government to establish sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements.	2007 – present	168	1	EUR 57.75m	EUR 9.24m
EUBAM Rafah, OPTs	Provides border assistance and monitoring at the Rafah Crossing Point on the Gaza-Egypt border.	2005 – present	6	0	EUR 1.27m	EUR 0.2m
EUPOL COPPS, OPTs	Contributes to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership.	2005 – present	50	2	EUR 9.18m	EUR 1.5m
EULEX	Rule of law mission to	2008 –	754	18	EUR 77m	EUR 12.3m

Kosovo	monitor, mentor and advise national authorities with regard to Police, Justice and Customs.	present				
EUMM Georgia	Monitors compliance with 2008 6-point plan agreement between Georgia and Russia.	Oct 2008 – present	201	11	EUR 18.3m	EUR 2.9m
EUAM Ukraine	Contributes to the development of effective, sustainable and accountable civilian security services.	July 2014 – present	87	4	EUR 13.1m	EUR 2.1m
EUCAP Nestor	Capacity building. Regional approach in the Horn of Africa and Western Indian.	2012 – present	56	2	EUR 17.9m to Dec 2015, then EUR 12.1 m to Dec 2016	EUR 2.9m, then EUR 1.9m
EUSEC RD Congo	Provides advice and assistance on Defence Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo.	2005 – Sep 2016	10	2	EUR 2.7m	EUR 0.4m
EUCAP Sahel Niger	Capacity building, through training and advising, to improve the capacities of Nigerien Security Forces.	July 2012 – present	43	1	EUR 9.8m	EUR 1.6m
EUCAP Sahel Mali	Capacity building to enable Malian authorities to restore and maintain constitutional and democratic order.	Jan 2015 – present	71	1	EUR 5.5m	EUR 0.9m
EUBAM Libya	Supports the Libyan authorities to develop capacity for enhancing the security of Libya's land, sea and air borders.	May 2013 – present	3	1	EUR 26.2m	EUR 4.2m